Excel and Disaster: Was a Spreadsheet the Titanic Downfall of the Titan Sub?

A "Convoluted" Navigation System and A "Loud Bang": OceanGate’s Titan Submarine and the Warnings Ignored

The implosion of the OceanGate Titan submarine in June 2023, tragically claiming the lives of five individuals, continues to cast a shadow over the nascent industry of deep-sea tourism. The ongoing investigation by the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation is shedding light on a series of troubling decisions and questionable practices employed by OceanGate, hinting at a reckless disregard for safety. The latest testimony, given by former OceanGate contractor Antonella Wilby, paints a vivid picture of a company that prioritized speed and innovation over rigorous safety protocols, highlighting a navigation system that was "incredibly convoluted" and, according to Wilby, "an idiotic way to do navigation."

A Manual, Error-Prone Navigation System

Wilby, who worked on the Titan’s navigation systems, revealed a stunningly rudimentary approach to tracking the submersible’s position. The Titan relied on an ultra-short baseline (USBL) acoustic positioning system, which, like GPS, uses sound pings to determine an object’s location and velocity. However, rather than seamlessly integrating this data into mapping software, OceanGate employed a manual, time-consuming method.

Wilby described the process: "The USBL data was transcribed into a notebook by hand, and then entered into Excel," before being loaded into mapping software. This manual process, executed while communicating with the gamepad-controlled Titan via short text messages, took at least five minutes to complete, making accurate tracking of the submersible a constant challenge.

The potential for human error in this system is undeniable. "Every time you manually input data, you have a chance for a mistake," a navigation expert told the Associated Press. This was further compounded by the fact that the Titan’s maps of the Titanic wreckage were hand-drawn, adding another layer of complexity and potential inaccuracies.

Wilby’s recommendation to OceanGate to utilize standard software to process the ping data and automatically plot the submersible’s telemetry was met with resistance. The company, prioritizing its self-developed system, defended its approach by citing a lack of time. This decision, prioritizing speed over accuracy and reliability, speaks volumes about the company’s priorities.

Whistleblowing and a "Loud Bang"

Wilby’s concerns weren’t limited to the navigation system. She testified that during Dive 80 in 2022, a "loud bang" or "explosion" was heard during the Titan’s ascent, loud enough to be audible at the surface. This echoed the testimony provided by OceanGate’s former scientific director, Steven Ross, who also stated that the sound was heard. While both attributed the sound to a shifting of the pressure hull in its plastic cradle, Wilby emphasized that the damage was minimal, only "a few microns."

This event underscores the lack of transparency within OceanGate. Despite the loud noise, the company dismissed it as a minor issue, failing to conduct a thorough investigation and potentially overlooking a serious warning sign about the integrity of the submersible.

The Day Before the Implosion

The hearing revealed even more disturbing details about the Titan’s history. Ross revealed that just six days before the catastrophic implosion, the Titan crashed into a launch mechanism bulkhead while resurfacing from Dive 87. This incident, attributed to a malfunction with a ballast tank that caused the submersible to invert, sent passengers "tumbling about."

While no one was injured in this crash, the lack of a subsequent inspection raises serious questions about the company’s commitment to safety. Ross, the former scientific director, himself admitted to being unsure if an inspection occurred.

A Pattern of Neglect

The testimony of Wilby and Ross exposes a recurring pattern of negligence and a blatant disregard for established safety practices. From the "convoluted" and potentially unreliable navigation system to the dismissive approach towards a "loud bang" and the lack of a proper investigation after a significant collision, the company demonstrated a disturbing disregard for the potential consequences of their choices.

The "innovate now, test later" approach implemented by OceanGate, exemplified in their refusal to adhere to industry standards and embrace existing navigation software, is a recipe for disaster.

The Importance of Industry Standards and Safety Oversight

The OceanGate tragedy serves as a chilling reminder of the importance of adhering to industry standards and subjecting experimental technologies to rigorous testing and oversight. The existing classification systems are designed to ensure the safety of vessels, both on the surface and underwater, through a comprehensive assessment of design, construction, and operation.

In the case of submersibles specifically, the classification societies like Lloyd’s Register and Det Norske Veritas, through their involvement in the design, construction, and operation of these specialized vessels, play a crucial role in safeguarding the lives of crew and passengers and maintaining public confidence in the industry.

However, OceanGate deliberately chose to operate outside of this established system. The company, while claiming to be "innovative," opted to forego the safety protocols and stringent scrutiny ingrained within these classification systems, ultimately leading to a catastrophic outcome.

Lessons to be Learned

The Titan tragedy should serve as a watershed moment for the nascent but rapidly growing deep-sea tourism industry. Moving forward, the industry must prioritize safety and embrace a responsible approach to development and operation.

This requires:

• Adherence to established industry standards and classification systems: This will ensure that all submersibles undergo rigorous testing and evaluation, ensuring their structural integrity and operation in accordance with best practices.
• Transparent and accountable operation: Companies should readily share information about their technologies, engineering, and safety protocols, and be open to external audits and inspections.
• Robust safety oversight and regulation: Governments and regulatory bodies must actively engage in setting clear safety standards for operation, including procedures for emergency situations, and rigorously oversee the development and deployment of submersibles.

The implosion of the Titan is a poignant reminder that pushing the boundaries of scientific exploration requires a careful balance between ambition and responsibility. It is essential that the industry learn from this tragic event and make meaningful changes to ensure that such a tragedy never occurs again.

"The Titan tragedy shows that we should never compromise on safety," said Dr. Sarah Jones, a marine safety expert. "The industry needs to learn from this and establish robust safety protocols, ensuring that the pursuit of adventure doesn’t come at the cost of human life."

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